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NOTES AND COMMENTS

itself with a basis upon which to hold that the trust purposes were
endangered, thereby fulfilling the requirement necessary to allow
deviation under existing law.
CowLEs LIIPFERT

Wills-Incorporation by Reference-Invalid Instruments
In Godwin v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.1 husband and wife
executed a trust agreement which the court conceded to be void as an
inter vivos trust because of the draftsman's failure to obtain and
certify a private examination of the wife as required by section 52-12
of the General Statutes. Both husband and wife executed wills of
even date with the trust instrument, each disposing of his property as
provided in the trust agreement. After the wife's death the husband
executed a new will which differed substantially from the terms of
the trust agreement. In an action by the trustee seeking specific performance of an alleged contract between husband and wife to will
their property according to the terms of the trust agreement, the
court held that the trust agreement was incorporated in the respective
wills by reference; that the wills themselves established the existence
of the alleged contract; and that the trustee was entitled to specific
performance for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the original
wills.
The doctrine of incorporation by reference2 is recognized in England and in a great majority of American jurisdictions.3 Four fea1259 N.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 456 (1963).
2 This doctrine should not be confused with the closely related doctrine of
"facts of independent legal significance." Professor Scott states, in reference
to the latter doctrine, that: "[A] disposition made in a will is not invalid
although its terms do not fully appear in the will,,if those terms can be ascertained from facts which have significance apart from their effect upon the
disposition in the will. The existence of a trust at the time of the testator's
death, created by him at some time prior to his death, is such a fact. It is
not the trust instrument, but the trust itseLf, which. has independent significance." 1 Scor, TRusTs § 54.3, at 367 (2d ed. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
Since a valid inter vivos trust was never created here, and the trust instrument cannot be a fact of independent significance, this doctrine would
seem inapplicable.
' ATxINSOX, WILLS § 80, at 385 nn. 4-5 (2d ed. 1953), and cases cited
therein. The doctrine is stated thusly in Newton v. Seaman's Friend
Soc'y, 130 Mass. 91, 93 (1881) : "If a will, executed and witnessed as required by statute, incorporates in itself by reference any document or paper
not so executed and witnessed, whether the paper referred to be in the form
of a will or codicil, or of a deed of indenture, or of a mere list or memoran-
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tures are generally requisite to an application of the doctrine: (1) the
extraneous document must have been in existence at the time of the
execution of the will;4 (Z) it must be referred to in the will as being in existence at the time of execution;5 (3) it must be identified
by satisfactory proof as the paper referred to ;6 and (4) the intention
of the testator to incorporate the paper or document in his will must
clearly appear from the will.'
The doctrine is based upon a fiction that the unattested instrument, invalid as a testamentary disposition by itself, becomes indum, the paper so referred to, if it was in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and is identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the
paper referred to therein, takes effect as part of the will, and should be admitted to probate as such."
S"An attempt to incorporate a future document is ineffectual, because a
testator cannot be permitted to create for himself the power to dispose of his
property without complying with the formalities required in making a will."
Simon v. Grayson, 15 Cal. 2d 531, 533, 102 P.2d 1081, 1082 (1940).
'Magoohan's Appeal, 117 Pa. 238, 14 AtI. 816 (1887).
' See Bottrell v. Spengler, 343 Ill. 476, 175 N.E. 781 (1931). Varying
degrees of strictness have characterized the decisions as to sufficiency of
identification. A direction to pay legacies "according to the directions written in a book by [M. W. P.], ...signed by me .. .and witnessed by said
[M. W. P.] ... " was held a sufficient description in Newton v. Seaman's
Friend Soc'y, 130 Mass. 91 (1881). The statement "this is a codicil to my
last will and testament" was definite enough to refer to an improperly executed will where no other will was found. Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moo. P.C.
427, 14 Eng. Rep. 757 (1858). A reference to an amount owed "on my
books" was sufficient where testator kept only one set of accounts. It re
Bresler's Estate, 155 Mich. 567, 119 N.W. 1104 (1909). Where two papers
were found in decedent's pocketbook, neither of which alone would constitute a valid testamentary disposition, but which would when construed together, and one referred to another paper "in my pocketbook," it was held to
incorporate the other so as to constitute a valid will. In re Miller's Estate,
128 Cal. App. 176, 17 P.2d 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932).
On the other hand, reference to "a sealed letter which will be found
with this will" was held not to be a "clear, explicit, unambiguous reference
to any specific document as one existing and known to the testator at the
time his will was executed." Bryan's Appeal, 77 Conn. 240, 58 Atl. 748
(1904). Mention of furniture "which she has got a list of" was not sufficient.
In re Goods of Greves, 1 Sw. & Tr. 250, 164 Eng. Rep. 715 (1858). A
testamentary provision reciting that testator had executed deeds to named
grantees, and that "said deeds" should become effective on testator's death
as provided in the deeds, did not describe the deeds sufficiently to incorporate
them in the will by reference. Brooker v. Brooker, 130 Tex. 27, 106 S.W.2d
247 (1937). And, where a will provided that "the balance be given to Kirwan
on a special purpose," parol evidence was not admissible to show that the
"special purpose" was fully described in a letter of even date with the will
when the will made no allusion to such letter. Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va.
511, 47 S.E.2d 431 (1948).
'Bottrell v. Spengler, 343 IIl. 476, 175 N.E. 781 (1931); Witham v.
Witham, 156 Or. 59, 66 P.2d 281 (1937); Richardson v. Byrd, 166 S.C.
251, 164 S.E. 643 (1932).
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corporated into the will at the place where the reference to it occurs;
consequently, the instrument is supported by the statutory formalities regulating the execution of wills." The policy considerations that
underlie allowing such incorporation are basically uncomplicated.
Primarily it is based upon the simple rule of convenience. The
necessity of setting out in the will a lengthy trust instrument is
eliminated. The testator may simply refer to the trust in one sentence, properly identifying and describing it, and declare that said
trust is then in existence and that it is his intent to incorporate the
same into his will. The courts will then refer to the terms of the
9
trust in the administration of testator's will and estate. Perhaps
equally significant is the social desirability of permitting the testator's
intention to be realized whenever possible."0 When incorporation by
reference is attempted, the courts are called upon to balance the intention of the testator against the technical requisites of the Statute
of Wills; when intention prevails, it may often be at a sacrifice of
the basic statutory policy.'"
Sacrifice of statutory policy seems to be the primary rationale
3
for disallowing incorporation by reference. While three other states'
17 U. PiTT. L. REv. 519, 520 (1956). See also Malone, Incorporation,
by Reference, of an Extrinsic Document Into a Holographic Will, 16 VA. L.
REv. 571, 572-73 (1930): "The basis of the prevailing view is, apparently,
that when the will itself is properly signed and witnessed, the statutory safeguards against fraud and imposition have been given full effect."
2 PAGE, WILS § 19.17 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960).
"°Evans, Nontestamentary Acts and Incorporation by Reference, 16 U.
CHI. L. REv. 635, 636 (1949). "If the intent of the testator is certain and
the possibility of fraud is eliminated, the incorporation of all formal trust
instruments should be allowed." 33 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 169, 171 (1958).
' The original English Statute of Wills was enacted in 1540. 32 Hen. 8,
c. 1 (1540). In a session held in 1542 and 1543 parliament passed 34 &
35 Hen. 8, c. 5, clarifying loosely drawn parts of the earlier act. The present North Carolina statutory law governing wills is found in N.C. GEN. STAT.
ch. 31 (1950).
- 6 ARK L. REv. 496, 498 (1952). It has been argued, however, that the

majority rule effectuates the testator's intention, while keeping the spirit of
the statute inviolate by means of the narrow limits within which the operation
of the rule is confined. 11 CoLum. L. REV. 456 (1911).
"Louisiana, New Jersey, and New York. The following dictum is often

stated as representing the Louisiana position: "And it may be conceded at

once that a will cannot be made by mere reference to another document not
itself a will or to a former will that is invalid for want of proper form. All
the French authorities agree on that." Succession of Ledet, 170 La. 449,
453, 128 So. 273, 274 (1930). Dicta opposing incorporation are cited from
numerous New Jersey cases in 2 PAGE, WILLS § 19.21 (Bowe-Parker rev.
1960). But Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Adt. 279 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1928), aflirining 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 AtI. 822 (Ch. 1926), seems to
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are often cited as denying incorporation by reference, only Connecticut has a square holding rejecting it. 4 The argument there was, in
effect, that the doctrine "militates against the authentication of the entire will, makes possible the sort of fraud against which the Statute of
Frauds and the Wills Act were aimed, and is inconsistent with the
requirement that a will be signed 'at the end thereof.' ,,a A further
consideration was that the doctrine of incorporation by reference
was developed in England prior to enactment of the Statute of Wills.
The court reasoned that the statement or public policy in the statute
overruled the previously established judicial doctrine.' 0
Incorporation by reference is not expressly prohibited by the
Wills Act. From the requirements that a will must be signed, published, and attested in a certain way, some courts have deduced that
the testator's purpose must be gathered from the will and not from
other documents which lack the prescribed marks of authenticity.
Denial of incorporation by reference is a product of judicial construction, designed to prevent fraud and mistake, and to uphold the
statutory policy.Y
North Carolina has consistently held with the majority view
allowing incorporation by reference.18 The leading case, Watson v.
Hinson,1sa states the North Carolina position thusly:
It is well recognized in this State that a will, properly executed,
may so refer to another unattested will or other written paper or
document as to incorporate the defective instrument and make the
same a part of the perfect will, the conditions being that the paper
recognize the doctrine. The leading New York case rejecting the doctrine
is Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891). But see In re
Fowles' Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918) and In re Rausch's Will,
258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932), where the court said the rule against
a "dryly
not506,
be carried
should
incorporation
(1907).logical extreme."
65 Atl. to1058
Conn.
Smith, 79
"Hathewayby v.reference
" Evans, Incorporationby Reference, Integration and Non-Testamentary
Act, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 879, 880 (1925).
Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 AtI. 1058 (1907).
UIn Re Fowles' Will 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
(books of account held in18 Bullock v. Bullock, 17 N.C. 307 (1832)
corporated, used to construe subsequent provision of will) ; Siler v. Dorsett,
108 N.C. 300, 12 S.E. 300 (1891) (case lost by parties seeking incorporation for failure to put extrinsic document in evidence, but doctrine clearly

recognized); In re Coffield, 216 N.C. 285, 4 S.E.2d 870 (1939) (codicil
incorporated and revised revoked will); Watson v. Hinson 162 N.C. 72,
77 S.E. 1089 (1913) (propounders granted new trial where second instrument made clear reference to one former will, and this feature had been alno effect as to validity of first).
lowed
188162 N.C. 72, 77 S.E. 1089 (1913).
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referred to shall be in existence at the time the second will is executed, and the reference to it shall be in terms so clear and distinct
that from a perusal of the second will or with the aid of parol or
other proper testimony, full assurance is given that the identity of
the extrinsic paper has been correctly ascertained. 19
In two cases20 North Carolina has refused to allow incorporation
by reference; however, this refusal was based upon the failure to
meet the requirement of sufficiency of identification of the document
to be incorporated rather than upon any limitation of the doctrine
itself.
The significant and somewhat unique aspect of the instant case
is the allowance of incorporation of an instrument that in itself
was invalid. The authority on the point is sparse,2 and neither the
courts nor the commentators have articulated with any thoroughness
the philosophical bases for such a result. It would seem, on the one
hand, that an instrument invalid as an inter vivos document should
not undergo a change in character by mere incorporation into a
will. To hold otherwise would seem to undermine the policy behind
the initial invalidity. The invalidity in, the principal case resulted
from failure to obtain the private examination of the wife as required
by section 52-12 of the General Statutes. The purpose of the statute
is to prevent frauds by the husband upon the wife,22 and our court
has stated that the statute proceeds on the idea, "not that there is
fraud, but that there may be fraud."
Strict application of the
Id. at 79-80, 77 S.E. at 1092 (1913).
Bailey v. Bailey, 52 N. C. 44 (1859); Chambers v. McDaniel, 28 N.C.

226 (1845).

" Our court cites the following in support of its holding: 94 C.J.S Wills

§ 163 (1956); Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d 51
(1950); Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70
N.E.2d 920 (1946) ; It re Sciutti's Estate, 371 Pa. 536, 92 A.2d 188 (1952).
Of these only Montgomery seems truly applicable. The writer found little
else directly in point, despite an abundance of authority on incorporation by
reference itself.
Apparently the only case refusing to allow incorporation of an invalid
instrument is Clark v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A.2d 108
(Ch. 1955). The court there held the existence of a valid trust on the date
of the execution of the will to be essential to incorporation, and thus refused
to allow incorporation of an invalid trust instrument. The case is criticized
in 17 U. PiTT. L. REv. 519 (1956).
2 Stout v. Perry, 152 N.C. 312, 67 S.E. 757 (1910); Long v. Rankin,
108 N.C. 333, 12 S.E. 987 (1891); Sims v. Ray, 96 N.C. 87, 2 S.E. 443
(1887).
" Lee v. Pearce, 68 N.C. 76, 81 (1873).
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statutory policy would have rendered the trust agreement void
through no actual fraud is apparent. By allowing incorporation by
reference, the court has given preference to the intention of the
testatrix. Whether the court would have reached a similar result
had the husband rather than the trust beneficiaries been asserting
that the trust agreement embodied the wife's intention-a situation
more directly involving the statutory policy-is a matter for speculation.2 4
The few courts which have allowed incorporation of an invalid
instrument have done so on the grounds that the instrument embodies the intention of the testator, the theory being that it is the
extrinsic writing itself, and not the legal effect, which should be
looked to.2" In Skerett's Estate California allowed a deed which
was invalid for lack of delivery to be incorporated into a testamentary writing. The intention of the testator was allowed to prevail over the formalities of conveyancing. "Any other conclusion,"
said the Pennsylvania court in a similar case, "would result in an
unreasonable violation of testator's scheme of distribution. ' m Where
testator devised his estate to a trust agreement which he had previously revoked, the Ohio court held that it was his "obvious intent"
to employ the disposition in the trust agreement as the terms of his
will, on the ground that a testator is never presumed to intend to
die intestate as to any part of his estate to which his attention seems
to have been directed. 28 In the Godwin case the allowance of incorporation would seem to implement the intention of the testators
as embodied in the trust agreement and the original wills.
In balancing the policy behind a document's invalidity against
a testator's intention, North Carolina has squarely held that the
testator's intention may be given effect by allowing incorporation into
' The

result reached would seem also to run counter to our "pour-over

trust" statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-47 (Supp. 1961), which seems to contemplate a previously established, valid, existing trust as prerequisite to a
valid devise or bequest.
" 17 U. PiTT. L. Rav. 519 (1956). Despite Professor Scott's contention
that it is the trust itself and not the trust instrument that has independent
significance, this argument sounds a great deal like the doctrine of "facts of
independent significance." See note 2, supra.
" 67 Cal. 585, 8 Pac. 181 (1885).
" In re Hogue's Will, 135 Pa. Super. 543, 550, 6 A.2d 108, 111 (1939).
See also Thompson's Ex'rs v. Lloyd, 49 Pa. 127 (1865).
8
Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E.2d
920 (1946).
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a will of an invalid instrument. The Godwzn case places North
Carolina among a small group of states with decisions on the precise
question, and helps to mark the state as a liberal jurisdiction on the
doctrine of incorporation by reference.
WILLIS PADGETT WHICHARD

